How Can the United States Improve its Current Voting System?


The Current Conflicts page is a resource for Workable Peace educators and students interested in applying their WP skills to current events. In this section, Workable Peace profiles a current conflict or controversial issue of national or global significance, from the viewpoint of two or more groups involved. For past conflicts that have been highlighted on these pages, please click here.

In this election season, our Current Conflict focuses on the problems with the mechanisms used for collecting and tabulating voting in the US, and in particular the current tensions over electronic voting, papers trails, and differences across districts.

Table of Contents



Background and History of Voting in the United States


The 12th Amendment of the United States Constitution provides a precise process for electing both the President and Vice-President. However, it does not specify the mechanisms to be used in voting, nor does it set voting standards for the nation. Throughout its history, the United States has continued to evolve its voting system along with technology. With each new system of voting has come some advancements in efficiency and accuracy, along with new controversy, as the nation continues its effort to provide safe, effective, and foul-proof voting for the country.

Paper ballots, sometimes called the “Australian ballot,” were first introduced to the United States in New York in 1889, and are still used today. These ballots usually have large boxes that can be marked by the voter, and the results are counted by hand. However, with large numbers of electoral races and large numbers of voters, the counting process can be quite cumbersome and is subject to human error. Furthermore, these ballots can be tampered with during transporting and counting and might be subject to vote buying and ballot box stuffing.

Mechanical lever voting machines were first used in Lockport New York in 1892, and were referred to as the “Myers Automatic Booth”. These machines allow election results to be determined quickly and make fraud less likely. However, there is no ability to “audit” these machines or recount ballots. Furthermore, if the wheel malfunctions and the counter wheel fails to turn, there is no tally to count the votes. During the 2000 Presidential election in New York City, levers on some of the machines were broken off so that people could not vote for certain offices. Nonetheless, as of March 2001, 15% of the counties in the United states continued to use these devises.

About twenty years ago, many counties in the state of Florida began using Punch-card voting systems in place of the mechanical levers. In the Votomatic system, the cards are printed with rows of marks where holes can be punched, but no names are printed on the cards. Instead, the names are listed on a ballot holder device, which can be placed over the card. Each hole lines up with the name of a candidate. Normally, officials try to place all of the names to the left of the holes, but they occasionally face a format that requires holes to be both on the left and on the right side of the names, resulting in a butterfly ballot. These ballots caused a controversy in not only the 2000 election, but also back in the 1987 election. In 1987, courts ruled that the ballots did not give the blacks in St. Louis equal opportunities to vote, because education differentials led to more mistakes with the ballot. As a result, the courts called for better voter education in the black wards and mandated that improperly marked ballots be counted by hand.

The Datavote system, which prints the candidates names directly on the card, reduces confusion but still poses problems. This system can becomes expensive, as most elections require more than one card. Under votes are also common because voters forget to vote for offices on the back of the punch cards. The votes are made using a mechanical hole puncher, which separates the chad from each hole.

The term chad originated in 1947 and refers to the small bit of paper that is pushed out on a ballot. Sometimes, people do not completely remove the chad from the ballot. Hanging chads have one corner of the chad still hanging on to the ballot, swinging chads have two corners still on the ballot, tri chads have three corners, and pregnant chads have all four corners still attach to the ballot and a hole punched through the center of the chad. Lastly, a dimpled chad has no hole through the chad, but only an small indentation. Any of these chads may not be properly counted by the machine.



To avoid the controversy of chads, Optical Scan Voting Systems (Marines), is currently being used in 40% of the counties in the United States. This system is similar to the familiar systems for standardized testing. The voter fills in an oval or connects the dots on a paper ballot and a machine then scans the ballots to count the votes. However, some people have found this system confusing, filling in the wrong oval, too many ovals, or incompletely filling the oval. In addition, these ballots can be tampered with between the time of voting and counting. Some precincts have responded to this with their own scanners, so that the voter can feed their ballot into the machine themselves and make sure that the vote is counted and correct.

Another device used for voting is the Direct Recording Electronic system. These systems, used in 9% United States counties in the 2000 election, have touch-screens for selecting the preferred candidate. The machines do not allow over voting, and warn the voter if they fail to vote for an office. However, the machines cannot be used for a recount, and leave no paper trail, and open the possibility of technological failure or tampering.

As the Internet becomes more publicly accessible, the possibilities for Internet voting are becoming popular. The first government election to be done on the Internet was in 1996 for the Reform party’s Presidential Primary. The Internet has since been used in small scale experiments, with limited stakes, which have been reported successful. Critics see many potential problems involving viruses, corruption, hacking, and user errors. However, the convenience of Internet voting and its potential to dramatically increase voter turnout makes it an appealing option.

All of these systems are governed only by voluntary federal standards, enacted in 1990.

For a more detailed description of voting systems used throughout the nation’s history, click here. More history is available in pdf format here.

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Historical Context: The 2000 Florida Presidential Election

The 2000 Florida Presidential election brought the nation’s attention to the faults of the current voting system. Some people argue that the inaccuracies in vote-counting that occurred in Florida are not unusual, and were only noticed because of the closeness of the race. The shocking truth about the inadequacy of the voting system to provide accurate results for the election brought widespread attention to the issue, and sparked debates on how to fix the nation’s problem.

On election day, the state of Florida was predicted to be won by Gore. However, as the day wore on, the state was awarded and revoked several times during the many news broadcasts. The race remained close as both candidates won their expected states. In addition to his expected states, Gore won Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Illinois while Bush took Ohio, Tennessee, and Missouri. The winner, it seemed, would be the candidate that took Florida’s Electoral College votes.

On the day after Election Day, the Florida Division of Elections reported that Bush led Gore by 1,784 votes. With the attention of the nation centering on it, Florida's votes displayed some strange patterns. In Palm Beach County, there was a surprisingly high amount of votes for the third party candidates, and some other counties had a high number of ballots that had not certified a vote. Both Bush and Gore sent lawyers to Florida, where under state law, a machine recount was mandated. These recounts narrowed the lead to only 327 votes out of the almost 6 million votes that were cast in the state. Gore’s team, lead by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, requested hand recounts in Palm Beach County, Miami-Dade, Broward, and Volusia. Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris refused to waive the November 14 deadline for submission of county vote totals. Bush’s team, headed by Secretary of State James Baker, went to the federal courts to try and halt manual recounts, but failed.

Over the next few weeks, the controversy led to no fewer than thirty separate and often simultaneous legal challenges in three federal and five state courts. These lawsuits sought to extend the certification deadline, block, allow, or force recounts, seek access to the ballots, and define a legal vote. Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris was instructed to "exercise discretion" in deciding whether to allow late vote tallies, and after hearing the arguments of three heavily Democratic counties, decided that she would not provide their extensions. The counties had based their demands on the irregularities of the vote, the statistical differences in the machine and hand-counts of over 1 percent of the county's vote, and the fact that these votes might change the results of the election.

Meanwhile, the overseas ballots were counted, increasing Bush's lead to 930 votes.

Harris proceeded to the Florida Supreme Court to demand that all manual recounts be stopped, but on November 16, the Court ruled unanimously that recounts could continue. Meanwhile, they held hearings to decide whether or not Harris should consider the hand recounts in certifying the election. Circuit judge Jorge Labarga declared that he was not given authority under the United States Constitution to mandate a new election to be held in the Palm Beach County, and instead gave counties five days to finish hand recounts, and demanded that these results be counted by the state. This new deadline posed a problem for many counties and Miami-Dade County stopped their recount due to the shortage of time. Bush filed an appeal to the US Supreme Court.

On November 26, Harris certified the election giving Bush a 537-vote lead over Gore. Her certification, however, did not include the results of Palm Beach County, which were completed two hours late. Multiple further lawsuits resulted, in circuit, state and federal court, until a final divided (5 to 4) ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court reverses an earlier decision of Florida Supreme Court regarding certification of the Palm Beach and Volusia recounts, bars additional counting, and sends the issue back to the Florida Supreme Court, who dismisses the case, finding that Florida Election law does not provide an answer to the dispute. Bush is declared the winner of the Florida electoral votes, and wins the election, 271 to 266.

What became clear during this conflict in Florida was a series of problem with Florida’s voting system. One set of problems involved access to vote. Some voters, and particularly persons of color, complained of being turned away and denied their right to vote because of excessive delays, misinformation, and confusion. These complaints have led to claims that Florida’s election was discriminatory as well as inaccurate. Moreover, some registered voters found that their names had been removed from the list of registered voters, and they too were turned away from the polls. Some precincts were also moved to new locations after years of being in the same place. Polls were also reported as closing early, not allowing people to vote. Following the election, the state received 2,600 voiced complaints, 1,000 letters of complaints, and 3,600 allegations.

Florida faced other problems with accessibility. The visually impaired were not given the proper equipment to allow them to vote in numerous precincts, and wheelchairs faced obstacles of stairs and unreachable polls. Non-English-proficient voters were not given the promised assistance needed in order to vote properly and therefore could not understand the already confusing ballots. The ballots used in some precincts like Palm Beach County were “butterfly ballots” in which the names and corresponding holes were lined up in a confusing manner. This format caused a surprisingly high amount of votes for the third party candidate in many Florida counties. Also, as a result of the confusing ballot, 63% of the votes in Palm Beach County were over votes (where more than one candidate was selected), and therefore not counted.

The last major problem that Florida faced was its machinery. Five different voting machines were used throughout Florida’s sixty-seven precincts. The diversity of machinery caused issues in the role of the statistical margin of error in the state. In twenty-four counties punch-cards were used, in sixteen counties optical scan central tabulation was used, twenty-five counties used optical scan precinct tabulation, one county used a paper ballot, and one county used a machine lever.

After the election was decided and left the public eye, the Media Consortium hired the National Opinion Research Center to investigate the 2000 Presidential election and the 175,010 ballots that were never counted in Florida. The investigation took eight months, cost $900,000, and showed that Gore should have won the state of Florida. On the contrary, a conservative legal group claimed that Bush rightfully won Florida. Through their investigation and the collective investigations of other groups, the team declared that Bush would have picked up enough votes to make up for the gains that Gore would make in a manual recount in Palm Beach and Broward counties. While the actual winner of Florida may never be known, it is certain that this controversy ignited the nation with a new sense of desire to improve the current voting system.

For more information on the Media Consortium investigation, click here

For more information on the investigation of the conservative legal team, click here

For a day-by-day timeline of the 2000 Florida Presidential Election, click here

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Analysis of the Conflict: Issues to be Resolved

As you read through the viewpoints, think about the following:

A. The key issues that need to be resolved:
  1. What standards and security should be implemented for the voting system that is used?
    Is the Federal Election Commission standard too weak, or outdated, or just right? Is the 2002 Help America Vote act necessary and beneficial?
  2. How consistent do voting systems need to be across all of the United States precincts?
    Is it necessary that all states, and all counties within states, use the same methods of voting? How do the statistical margins of error affect the election?
  3. Which voting system will be the most dependable and convenient to voters?
    How dependable are these systems? Is there a need for paper trails? Are they accessible to the disabled? What is an acceptable margins of error?
  4. How much of a role should cost play in the decision of a voting system?
    How should the costs of voting systems be shared among the county, state, and federal governments? What are the best financial investments?

B. The key interests, beliefs, identities, and emotions of the writers advocating the various responses:

C. The writers' perspective on the interests, beliefs, identities, and emotions of others who have different points of view, and who may be affected by this conflict.

The Workable Peace Sources Chart provides a tool for this examination. (html or pdf)

The viewpoints below represent come of the range of perspectives on the current choices faces the US as it makes it next steps regarding voting systems.

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Viewpoints on 'How can the United States improve its current voting system?'

Perspective 1: Direct Recording Electronic voting systems are not only dependable and convenient, but also have high security. These machines should be used in all counties, to avoid the unfair advantages and disadvantages and the differential impact of different votes caused by using multiple types of mechanisms. Paper trails are not necessary and a waste of resources.

The machines have safeguards including the backing up of information at least twice to prevent mechanical failures. In addition, any changes to votes are logged and tracked, while the engineers have encrypted and protected data with digital signature. The voting software must pass the standards of the Federal election Commission and the National Association of State Elections Directors. Recounts have been argued as faulty because they can be easily tampered with, so voter verified paper ballots are an unnecessary added expense. Moreover, if the machine is tested, it will include internal audit logs and make programming errors impossible and recovery from accidental error possible. The software that runs the machines is not subject to public scrutiny because it is proprietary. Even if it is impossible to build a perfect machine, there is a capability to create a machine with less error than paper ballots. The machine that has been created is both easy to use and dependable. Touch-screen systems allow voters to avoid voting for too many candidates or the wrong candidate. Also, if the voter fails to vote for an office, the system warns them of their action. The machines show the intent of the voter without error, since there are no chads or opportunity for mis-marking ballots. In the 2000 election, 10% of the voters in the United States used touch-screen systems. This year, almost 18% use them, which shows that voters see them as both dependable and convenient. Moreover, touch-screen systems are easy for the blind population to use because the can be adapted with audio units.

Using different equipment in different counties leads to questions of all votes being treated equally, as the error rates for different machines are different, and different machines are used across the country. If a candidate has more support in a precinct with equipment with higher error rates and less support in a precinct with lower error rates, the candidate could be at a disadvantage in a close election, depending on the way that voting equipment is distributed throughout the state and country.

Primary Source Accounts:

 

Perspective 2: The standards of the Direct Recording Electronic machines are out-of-date, and voter-verified paper ballots are essential to prevent fraud, error, and corruption. Furthermore, DRE machines and Internet voting may be less dependable than other methods, and therefore fail to provide accurate election results.

The use of electronic voting machines should not be permitted without a paper ballot. Voter verified paper ballots should be implemented to certify vote totals and be available in the case that there needs to be an election recount. In the November 2000 Presidential election, a computer glitch was discovered in Roosevelt county, New Mexico, which caused 533 absentee ballots to be counted improperly. Since optical scan ballots were used, the software was fixed and the ballots were rescanned two days after the election. However, without the ability to rescan ballots, the problem would not have been fixed. Meanwhile, in the same election in New Jersey, a DRE machine failed to count fifty votes, but the failure could not be corrected.This demonstrates the need of a paper trail for any electronic machines.

The government standards for the machines are outdated. The recent update, the 2002 Help America Vote Act, has been late in being installed and is not a proper response. The Federal Election Commission guidelines have been certified by only thirty-seven of the states, and are not protective enough. Not only are there no requirement that vote tallies be independently auditable, but commercial software products used in tabulating and balloting are not required to be inspected. Furthermore, the detectability of tampering on DRE machines is still uncertain. If scientists cannot freely investigate the machines, then they are vulnerable to both hacking and tampering. The machines are not as dependant as the vendors claim - there have already been several court cases filed alleging malfunctions in the machines. For example, in the September primaries in Florida, voters were turned away because of touch-screen malfunctions and a lack of trained poll workers.

The Supreme Court made a decision in Bush vs. Gore that a legal vote must have ‘a clear indication of the intent of the voter.’ However, if a DRE machine is used, they must rely on the dependability of the machine to count the vote correctly. Furthermore, the output of the machine is only 'circumstantial’ evidence to the voter’s intent and is not considered ‘real’ evidence.

Internet voting is very risky due to the ability of web sites to be spoofed, viruses, and hacking. There is no guarantee that the ballots are recorded anonymously and accurately or that the vote was placed by the correct person. The government claims that it is the individual’s job to get anti-virus software for their computer but the government fails to notice that the software would only protect the computer from known malware and server based attacks would still be possible. In the past, Internet voting services have not been dependable. Election.com was disrupted by the Slammer worm in the Toronto election on January 23, 2003. Also, the elections that have taken place via the Internet thus far have been small scale with limited stakes. The Arizona election faced failures that could have been devastating had the election been more contentious. There were incompatibilities between Macintosh computer and some voting system software, there were errors in voter registration logs, insufficient telephone help support, and a user interface that was inaccessible to blind voters.

Primary Source Accounts:


Perspective 3: The cost of the Direct Recording Electronic machines is too high. The country should invest instead in improving Internet voting and other low cost options. Internet voting would also increase voter turnout. Since states and counties bare most of the cost of voting mechanisms, they should decide which voting systems are used within their borders.

Direct Recording Electronic machines cost about $5,000 each and most states are looking to replace voting equipment with about $100 million dollars already. Most of the cost would have to come out of state and local budgets. As Internet access becomes more accessible, people in districts that currently use mail-in voting systems could benefit. Internet voting would not only be cheaper than vote-by mail elections but would also be cheaper than the DRE machines and far more convenient to these districts. Also, it could be used for citizens who are overseas that want to vote. Anti-virus software could protect the voting system. Already, the 2000 Arizona Democratic Party election and the 2000 Alaskan Republican Party election have successfully used Internet voting. Also, in the November 2000 election, overseas military personnel were allowed to vote via the Internet.

The use of the Internet would increase voter turnout and follow the outlined security measures from the California Internet Voting task Force’s January 2000 proposal. Scanners could be installed for the use of punch cards. Or, optically scanned ballot systems with electronic equipment, which are currently used by the disabled, could be used. They are one-tenth as expensive as the fully electronic DRE machines and are recountable, reliable, and easy to use. Lastly, if the 20 or so DRE vendors were mandated to share data, the money could be well spent on new machines created from the generated data of this interaction. DRE machines could be created from off-the-shelf personal computers. This would reduce the cost by a factor of 10, and some DRE vendors even promote off-the-shelf PCs as an inexpensive alternative. There would be less risk of tampering with these PCs in opposition to DRE machines because they would not be created for the sole purpose of voting.

States are given the right to decide how elections will be run within their borders. If there is an election that is closer than the statistical margin of the machine being used in the district, a tie could be declared. This possible solution would deal with results equal to the statistical error and would be followed by another vote.

Primary Source Accounts:

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Other Resources on the Voting Debate

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Classroom Activities

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Extension Activities

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This page was researched and written by Workable Peace Intern Colleen Watras, a junior at Needham High School, who is currently focusing her studies on journalism.